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policies that made migration easier. In this paper, we quantify the impact of migration policy changes on China's growth, structural change, and regional income convergence.

To accomplish this, we compile unique and detailed data on production, capital, employment, trade, and migration in China. These data reveal four key facts concerning China's structural change and regional convergence. First, there was significant regional convergence in real GDP per worker between 2000 and 2015. The variance of the cross-province (log) GDP per worker declined by a third, from 0.24 in 2000 to 0.15 in 2015. Second, over the same period, there were little convergence in GDP per worker within the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. Third, structural change was a net import to growth and convergence. The fraction of employment in agriculture fell from 53% in 2000 to 28% in 2015. The largest changes occurred in provinces with lower initial levels of income, where agricultural employment, and larger gaps in labor productivity between the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. Therefore, reallocation of labor from agriculture to the non-agriculture sector resulted in larger increases in aggregate GDP per worker in poor provinces than in richer provinces and contributed significantly to the convergence in aggregate income across provinces. Fourth, the structural change is closely related to inter-provincial migration. Provinces with higher shares of employment in agriculture in 2000 had larger inter-provincial migration flows. These facts suggest that migration-induced structural change is essential for China's growth and regional income convergence between 2000 and 2015.

We bring our data to a rich yet tractable spatial equilibrium model of China's economy to both measure changes in migration costs and other frictions in China's economy and to quantify their impacts on migration, structural change, growth, and regional income convergence. We find that between 2000 and 2015 migration costs fell by forty-five percent, with the cost of moving from agriculture rural areas to non-agriculture urban areas falling even more. In addition to contributing to growth, these migration cost changes account for the majority of the reallocation of workers out of agriculture and the drop in regional income inequality. We compare the effect of migration policy changes with other important economic factors, including changes in trade costs, capital market distortions, average cost of capital, and productivity. While each contributes meaningfully to growth, migration policy changes are central to China's structural change and regional convergence. Finally, we find that the slowdown in growth between 2010 and 2015 is associated with a slower reduction in inter-provincial migration costs and a larger role of capital accumulation during this five-year period.

Our model builds on recent developments in international trade. In particular, we extend the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to the multi-sector as in Caliendo and Parro (2015) and incorporate both imperfect spatial and sectoral labor mobility as in Föllmeier and Zühlke (2019). In addition, we allow for capital as an input in production and frictions in capital allocation across space and sectors. To better identify inter-sector migration costs, we also consider a household preference that are non-otetic to control for the impact of income growth on rural-urban migration.

Our work contributes to the literature investigating the effect of China's systems, and recent reforms to it. Most recently, Zi (2019) explores the effect of inter-provincial migration on China's labor market and how trade liberalization improves welfare. In particular, restricting the domestic

Finally, our paper is closely related to a different body of work by Fatas and Zúñiga (2019). We extend their work on the effect of trade on the growth of China by incorporating the role of physical capital as an input in production and the effect of trade on the growth of China's growth between 2000 and 2005 to a longer and more recent period, from 2000 to 2015. Most importantly, we go beyond their analysis of aggregated GDP growth by studying the impact of migration costs, trade costs, capital market distortions, and productivity. We document the results of this quantitative analysis in Section 4 before concluding in Section 5.

We begin our analysis with a detailed review of the data in Section 2, where we document the key patterns in China's regional economic growth, structural change, and migration between 2000 and 2015. With the data in hand, we develop a rich model of China's economy that can be brought to the data in Section 3. We then use this model to quantify the magnitude and consequences of migration costs, trade costs, capital market distortions, and productivity. We document the results of this quantitative analysis in Section 4 before concluding in Section 5.

2. Migration, structural change, and regional income convergence

In this section, we document the large income disparity across provinces and between the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors in China in 2000, and the significant regional income convergence and structural change between 2000 and 2015. We also provide evidence suggesting that the structural change and regional income convergence are intimately related. We then discuss the migration policy changes and the resulting increases in inter-provincial migration as a potential driver for both the structural change and regional income convergence. First, however, we discuss briefly the data we use for the paper.

2.1. Data

For our analysis, we combine three sources of data on inter-provincial migration, inter-provincial trade, and provincial economic accounts in China. We briefly list the important variables here, and provide a more thorough description in the appendix.

Migration. Our migration data are from China's population census. In addition to the 2000 and 2005 census data used by Fatas and Zúñiga (2019), we also use the county-level micro data of the 2010 and 2015 population census of China. These census data provide detailed information about rural-urban and cross-provincial migration from 2000 to 2015.

Trade. We construct inter-provincial trade flows based on the inter-provincial input-output table for 2002, 2007, and 2012 from Li (2010), Liu et al. (2012), and Liu et al. (2018), respectively.

Provincial GDP and Employment. We construct provincial GDP, capital stock, and employment for agriculture and non-agriculture based mainly on the data published in the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) by China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The construction methods for GDP and employment are the same as in Fatas and Zúñiga (2019). However, after 2010, the NBS no longer publishes provincial-level employment by sector. For 2015, we therefore estimate provincial employment based on the data published in the provincial yearbooks. We describe the full estimation procedure in the appendix.

Provincial Capital Stock. The CSY reports China's Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) by province but not by sector. However, it does report the fixed-asset investment by province and sector. We approximate each sector's share of capital formation by using the sector's share of total fixed-asset investment. The real investment is China's GFCF deflated using the province-specific investment price index reported in the CSY. We then construct capital stock using a perpetual inventory method assuming a depreciation rate of 7%. The average investment growth rates of the first ten years of a province are used to generate initial capital stock values for 1978. Our estimates of annual real investment, less depreciation, are then used to calculate capital stock in subsequent years.

2.2. Facts

Fatas and Zúñiga (2019) document large differences in real labor income across provinces and between the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors in China in 2000, and they argue that a potential reason for these differences is the system that imposes severe restrictions on worker mobility within China. Here we show the evolution of the distribution of real returns to labor across provinces and sectors over the 15-year period after 2000.

Using data on real GDP, employment, and factor shares, the real marginal return to labor is

$$= \alpha \tilde{\beta} \cdot \frac{Y}{L}, \quad (1)$$

where Y is real GDP of sector i in province j , L is employment, $\tilde{\beta}$ is labor's share of value-added, and α is the share of non-agricultural goods and services in GDP. We display the distribution of real marginal returns to labor for 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 in Fig. 1a, which reveals persistence with inter-sector dispersion of labor returns across provinces and large gaps


[†] These data are from NBS micro survey databases: 2010 China Population Census micro-database and 2015 % Sample China Population Census micro-database.

where β_i denotes capital's (α_i) share of value-added and y_i is the output per capita GDP of sector i in province i . Note that we use the output per capita rate rather than the return to capital because capital owners can invest across locations and sectors without having to consider the investment destination. Therefore they care about the return differences only and the differences in the cost of living across locations and sectors do not directly affect their investment decisions. If there are no capital market frictions, the investors' arbitrage would imply that the return to capital is equalized across all sectors and provinces. So, the dispersion in the return to capital reflects frictions that result in capital misallocation. As illustrated in Fig. 1b, the dispersion of capital returns across provinces was persistently large in agriculture, but significantly smaller in the non-agriculture sector. There was a decline in the dispersion of capital returns in the non-agriculture sector between 2000 and 2005, but the dispersion increased between 2006 and 2015. The Chinese government's massive infrastructure and stimulus spending after the global financial crisis may have contributed to the worsening capital allocation during that period, as pointed out by Bai et al. (2016).

2.3. Labor income

While the within-sector dispersion in labor income did not show a significant decline between 2000 and 2015, there was a dramatic reduction in the inequality of the aggregate provincial labor income over the same period. The cross-province variance of log real GDP per worker was 0.24 in 2000. But by 2015, this variance declined to 0.15 – a one-third reduction in regional income inequality. Besides, this significant decline was faster than labor income growth experienced by individual regions. Panel (a) of Fig. 2, we display the growth rates of real GDP per worker between 2000 and 2015 of all the provinces against their initial real GDP per worker in 2000. There is a significant negative relationship between the initial level of income and subsequent income growth, implying that the convergence over this 15-year period. Regressing the average growth on initial real GDP per worker reveals a precisely estimated β -convergence coefficient of approximately 2%. That is, a 0% higher initial income level is associated with a 0.2% lower average annual growth rate.

What's behind this reduction in regional inequality? Panel (b) of Fig. 2,






Table 1
Wor er migratio i C i a, 2000–20 5.

	tra-Provi cia				ter-Provi cia			
	2000	2005	20 0	20 5	2000	2005	20 0	20 5
†ota migratio Stoc Em m (%)	0 .5	32.6	76.2	2 5.7	29.7	47.0	79.2	90.2
†ota migratio s	4.	7.8	22.9	28.0	4.	6.5	0.3	.7
g-to-No ag migratio s	3.0	6.5	2 .6	25.5	3.3	5.2	8.6	7.0
No migratio g Wor ers	63.0	55.5	46.3	3 .6	63.0	55.5	46.3	3 .6

Note: Dis p ays t e u mber of wor ers ivi g a d wor i g outside t eir area of registratio . † e rst row is i i o s. † e ast t ree rows are s ares of tota op oyle t.

wor er migratio from agricu ture to o -agricu ture, bot wit i - a d betwee -provi ces, ca be a importa t driver of t e structura c a ge i C i a.

2.4. I m C

Before tur i g to t e data o migratio a d structura c a ge, we rst provide a summary of C i a's i ter a migratio policy a d rece t c a ges to it. † e C i ese gover t for a y i stituted a ouse o d registratio or syste i 958 to co tro labor mobi ity. C a (20 9) provides a detaied a d up-to-date discussio of t e syste a d its reforas. Brie y, eac C i ese citize is assig ed a , c assi ed as "agricu tura (rura)" or " o -agricu tura (urba)" i a speci c ocatio . Individua s eed approvas from oca gover t e ts to c a ge t e category (agricu tura or o -agricu tura) or ocatio of , a d it is e t e y difficu t to obtai suc approvas. additio , prior to 2003, wor ers wit out oca


ad to appy for a temporary reside ce permit. s t e de a d for migratio wor ers i a ufacturi g, co structio , a d abor i te sive service i dustries i creased, a y provi ces, especia y t e coasta provi ces, e i i ated t e require t of temporary reside ce permit for migratio wor ers after 2003. † ere was a so a atio -wide ad i istrative refor i 2003 t at great y strea i ed t e process for getti g a temporary reside ce permit i ot er provi ces. † ese policy c a ges made it muc easier for a wor er to eave t eir ocatio a d wor so ew ere e se as a migratio wor er. owever, eve wit a temporary reside ce permit, migratio wor ers wit out oca ave i ited access to oca pub ic services a d face ig er costs for ea t care a d for t eir c i dre 's educatio . t e ate 990s, a few oca es bega e per i e ti g wit e i i ati g t e disti ctio betwee oca agricu tura / o -agricu tura popu atio s, providi g a oca reside ts wit a e tit i g t e equa access to oca pub ic services. † is was eve tua y for a ized a d e te ded to t e w o e atio i 20 4. t t e sa e time, owever, t e gover t as tig te ed t e require t for gra ti g to migratio i t e rst- a d seco d- tiered cities. So, over time, it as beco e easier for a rura migratio wor er to obtai i a oca urba area i ower tiered cities, but it as beco e arder i rece t years for t e to move to arge coasta cities due to t e stricter restrictio s t ere.

Based o popu atio ce sus data, we report i abe bot i ter-provi cia a d i tra-provi cia migratio i C i a for t e years of 2000, 2005, 20 0, a d 20 5.² s a refere ce, we a so report t e s are of wor ers w o are o migratio agricu tura wor ers. wor er is de ed as a i ter-provi cia migratio i f t ey wor ed outside t eir provi ce of registratio . d t ey are de ed as a i tra-provi cia migratio i f t ey wor ed wit i t eir provi ce of registratio but outside t eir sector of registratio . Our de itio of i tra-provi cia migratio is broader t a usua. So e wor ers wit agricu tura ay wor i o -agricu tura jobs oca y (wit i t e vi age or tow s ip of t eir registratio) a d t ey are c assi ed as i tra-provi cia migratio wor ers. We coose t is de itio because we d from t e 2005 i i ce sus data t at t e average i co e of t ese oca "migratio wor ers" is ore t a 2.5 times as ig as t at of t e oca fa i ers. † is suggests t at t ere are sig i ca t frictio s for rura wor ers switc i g sectors oca y. Our robust ess a alysis ater, we wi co sider a stricter de itio of migratio wor ers.

s docu e ted by † o be a d Z u (20 9), t e re a atio of restrictio s o migratio betwee 2000 a d 2005 resu ted i sig i ca t i creases i bot i tra- a d i ter-provi cia migratio .³ † e ge era tre d sees to ave co ti ued betwee 2005 a d 20 5, wit t e i tra- a d i ter-provi cia migratio wor ers' s ares of tota op oyle t i creased from 7.8% a d 6.5%, respective y, i 2005, to 28% a d .7% i 20 5. Betwee 20 0 a d 20 5, owever, t e i crease i i ter-provi cia migratio s owed sig i ca t y, a d t e cross-provi cia rura-urba migratio wor ers' s ares of tota op oyle t i 20 5 is actua y ower t a t at i 20 0. co trast, wit i -provi ce rura-urba migratio co ti ued to i crease sig ifica t y t roug 20 5. † ese patter s are co siste t wit t e policy c a ges adopted by t e C i ese gover t e after 20 0 t at ave made ovi g to top tier cities, t e desti atio s of muc of t e i ter-provi cia migratio , muc arder for peop e wit rura a d, at t e sa e time, e couraged oca urba izatio i poor i a d a d wester provi ces.

² † e migratio stoc s are ca cu ated from t e data o migratio s ares from t e ce sus data a d t e tota op oyle t data i t e C i a Statistics Yearboo s. See appe di for detai s.

³ Our estimated migratio stoc s are sig i y differe t from t ose reported by † o be a d Z u (20 9) because we ow use ore detaied sa e weig ts provided by t e NBS.



levels of income with each region in a tractable manner.⁴ In that case, a closed-form representation of the direct utility function does not exist, it includes the standard Cobb-Douglas preferences as a special case when $B = 0$ and $\epsilon = 1$. The implied aggregate shares of expenditure allocated to goods and services are provided in the following proposition.

Proposition 1.

$$\Psi^* = \alpha\phi + B \left(\frac{1}{\left(\frac{\phi}{1-\phi} \right)^\alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon}, \quad (6)$$

$$\Psi^* = \alpha(1-\phi) - B \left(\frac{1}{\left(\frac{\phi}{1-\phi} \right)^\alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon}, \quad (7)$$

$$\Psi^* = -\alpha \quad (8)$$

$$\omega = \left[\sum_{m=1}^M \left(\frac{1}{\omega} \right)^{-\epsilon} \omega \right]^{-1/\epsilon} \quad m \quad m \quad , \quad \omega \propto L$$

Proof. See the appendix. \square

These expenditure shares imply that as income grows large, the shares are allocated to the purchase of the agricultural good converges to $\alpha\phi$ from above. Similarly, the shares are allocated to the non-agricultural good converges to $\alpha(1-\phi)$ from below. The shares are allocated to services is determined. In the rest of the paper, we will consider the case when $B = 0$.

In certain situations, it is convenient to represent utility as a function of real income and expenditure shares. Using Eq. (6) to substitute for relative prices in Eq. (5), one can write the utility of an individual with real income y and expenditure shares ψ^* of their income to agricultural goods as

$$u(y) = \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon} - \frac{\psi^* - \alpha\phi}{\gamma} \right) y^\epsilon. \quad (9)$$

It is easy to prove particularly useful in the calibration and quantitative analysis to income, as it maps directly to data on expenditure shares and real income.

3.2.

Within each sector, all goods are produced as aggregates over a continuum of individual varieties $v \in [0, 1]$ according to the CES technology

$$Y = \left(\int_0^1 (v)^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} dv \right)^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}, \quad (10)$$

where σ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. For each variety, producers use labor, capital, and a composite intermediate good to produce output using the Cobb-Douglas technology,

$$y(v) = (v)^{\beta_1} (v)^{\beta_2} (v)^{\beta_3} \prod_{m \in \{1, \dots, M\}} m(v)^{\beta_m}, \quad (11)$$

where $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \sum \beta_m = 1$. It implies that the marginal cost of production is inversely proportional to productivity and proportional to the cost of a unit of input bundle

$$\propto (v)^{\beta_1} (v)^{\beta_2} (v)^{\beta_3} \prod_{m \in \{1, \dots, M\}} (v)^{\beta_m}. \quad (12)$$

When a sector's composite output is not traded, individual varieties are. Trade is costly, however, and τ units must be shipped for one to arrive at the destination. Trade within a region is costless, and therefore $\tau = 1$. Forget for a moment the marginal costs of production, the price for sector varieties produced in region i is shipped to region j is

$$p_j(v) = \tau / p_i(v). \quad (13)$$

⁴ An alternative choice is the non-stochastic CES preferences (Coles et al., 2005). However, in that case, we cannot aggregate consumption decisions of the migrants and non-migrants to the demand of a representative agent. This is primarily for the reason that we opt for the PGL specification.

the overall pattern of consumer and business intermediate spending across possible suppliers from either their own region or from others such that the cost of a sector's aggregate composite good is minimized. As demonstrated by Eaton and Kortum (2002), if productivity is distributed Fréchet, with CDF given by $F(\tau) = 1 - \tau^{-\theta}$, with variance parameter θ and location parameter τ , the cost of total sector spending allocated by buyers in region i to producers in region j is

$$\pi_{ij} \propto \left(\frac{\tau_{ij}}{\tau_i} \right)^{-\theta}, \quad (4)$$

where the price index is

$$P_i \propto \left[\sum_{j=1}^{N+1} (\tau_{ij})^{-\theta} \right]^{-1/\theta}. \quad (5)$$

Both Eqs. (4) and (5), the cost share of proportionality is constant across regions and sectors.

Trade shares from Eq. (4) determine total sales of each sector in a region. Given total spending by consumers and firms in region i on goods from sector j , total revenue is

$$R_{ij} = \sum_{j=1}^{N+1} \pi_{ij}, \quad (6)$$

which implies intermediate demand by firms is $\beta_{ij} R_{ij}$. Combined with a demand spending by consumers $\Psi_{ij}^{-1} L$, total spending on good j by consumers and firms in region i is therefore

$$D_{ij} = \sum_{i \in \{1, \dots, N\}} \Psi_{ij}^{-1} L + \sum_{i \in \{1, \dots, N\}} \beta_{ij} R_{ij}. \quad (7)$$

3.3. Intermediate demand

Workers earn income from working and, for non-migrant workers, from their claims to a dividend capital return. Broadly consistent with Cias's institutional setting, we presume only local non-migrant individuals receive income from a dividend capital in their province and sector. Thus, the income of migrant workers is only their wage, while the income of non-migrant locals is δ , where $\delta > 1$ represents the ratio of total income including rebate of a dividend capital income to labor income. We show how to determine the equilibrium value of δ below.

Total rebates in each province and sector combine a number of sources. Total spending on a good, for usage by individuals and as an input to production by firms, equals total dividend rebates. Specifically, if sectoral sales are R_{ij} the spending on a good j is $\beta_{ij} R_{ij}$ and if consumer income is L the total spending on good j is $(1 - \alpha)^{-1} L$. Together, if total dividend supply in a given province and sector is \bar{H} the total dividend is

$$\bar{H} = \beta_{ij} R_{ij} + (1 - \alpha)^{-1} L. \quad (8)$$

Similarly, spending on capital by producers is proportional to their total sales $\beta_{ij} R_{ij} = \alpha K$.

3.4. $C = m$

Capital market clearing is at the aggregate level. That is, total capital demand by producers in all sectors and provinces must add to the total capital supply \bar{K} . Since each sector in each province optimally chooses a quantity of capital demand to equate the marginal revenue product of capital to the cost of capital they face, which reflects the average cost of capital common to all sectors and the capital wedge facing that particular sector and province. Specifically, given capital wedges such that $\beta^* \psi^* / K = \psi^* \equiv \tau / (1 - \tau)$, we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j \in \{1, \dots, J\}} \frac{\beta^* \psi^*}{\beta^*} L = \bar{K}, \quad (22)$$

since $\beta^* \psi^* = L$ and for all i and j . This expression illustrates that, as we see equation (22), a reduction in the average cost of capital reflects a rising aggregate supply \bar{K} . This will prove to be an important component of the recent growth in China.

To compute the mode, we set to solve for the equilibrium migration shares m and employ the L in each province and sector.

3.5. $C = m$

Workers in China choose where to live (and work) to maximize welfare. Workers are heterogeneous in their taste for different provinces and sectors, and face costs when moving outside their province of registration. Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors in the rest of the world. We decide given which province and sector to work, and then divide the province and sector compares the potential utility even in the destination, the migration costs between (i, j) and (i', j') , and the potential loss of a demand capital cost reflected in δ . From Eq. (9), this is as follows

$$= \begin{cases} \left(\frac{\delta^*}{\epsilon} - \frac{\psi^* - \alpha\phi}{\gamma} \right) v^* & =, = \\ \left(\frac{\delta^*}{\epsilon} - \frac{\psi^* - \alpha\phi}{\gamma} \right) v^* & \neq, \neq \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

where ψ^* and v^* are the specific prices of agriculture goods and real cost per worker for migrating workers living in province and sector. Additionally, the worker preferences over locations be captured by δ , which is distributed identically and independently across workers and follows a Fréchet distribution with variance parameter κ . Workers then choose the destination (i, j) to maximize δ^* / μ^* . So given for the shares of workers that opt to move to each possible destination is straightforward. We provide the equilibrium migration shares in the following proposition:

Proposition 3. Given ϵ, m, μ^*, F and $F(\cdot)$,

$$m = \frac{\left(\delta^* / \mu^* \right)^\kappa}{\sum_{i' \in \{1, \dots, I\}} \sum_{j'=1}^N \left(\delta^* / \mu^* \right)^\kappa} \quad (24)$$

m $m \in [0, 1]$

Proof. See the appendix. \square

This expression for migration shares conveniently summarizes the pattern of inter-provincial and inter-sectoral moves by workers. Note that the parameter κ measures the elasticity of migration with respect to utility. From Eq. (9), we can see that the elasticity of migration with respect to real cost is $\epsilon\kappa$, which can be directly estimated from the data. So, for a given value of ϵ , we can use the estimated real cost elasticity of migration to infer the utility elasticity κ .

Finally, given the migration shares and the registration, total employment in each province and sector is

$$L = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j \in \{1, \dots, J\}} m \bar{L}, \quad (25)$$

and the number of migrants is $L = m \bar{L}$.

4. Quantitative analysis

We now bring the full mode to data. We first calibrate the values of the time-varying mode parameters. Given these parameter values and for each of the four years (2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015), we calibrate the migration costs, trade costs, capital wedges, the average cost of capital, and the province-sector specific TFPs so that the

Table 2
Mode parameters and initial equilibrium values.

Parameter	Value	Description
(β^L, β^H)	(0.27, 0.9)	Labor's share of output
(β^L, β^H)	(0.06, 0.5)	Capital's share of output
(β^L, β^H)	(0.26, 0.0)	Land's share of output
(β^L, β^H)	(0.6, 0.0)	Agriculture's share of output
(β^L, β^H)	(0.25, 0.6)	Non-agriculture's share of output
α	0.87	Goods' expenditure share
ϕ	0	Agriculture goods' expenditure share
γ	0.30	Price-effect expenditure share
ϵ	0.70	Commodity-effect expenditure share
Ψ^L	D	Agriculture goods' expenditure share
θ	2.0	Elasticity of trade
κ	2.0	Heterogeneity in consumption preferences
π	D	Trade shares
m	D	Migration shares
\bar{L}	D	Initial registrations

Notes: Displays the initial mode parameters and initial equilibrium values for endogenous objects set to initial data prior to solving the model in relative calibrations. See text for details.

4.1. Calibration of the model

To ease the calibration and quantitative exercise, we solve the model in relative calibrations as in Deaton et al. (2007). It requires a number of equilibrium objects be set equal to data in the initial period equilibrium, which in our case is the year 2000. The key objects here are the initial trade shares π , migration shares m , and numbers of registered workers \bar{L} . In particular, we use the migration shares matrix from the 2000 census and the employment by province and sector from the 2000 CSY to back out the initial numbers of registered workers by province and sector,⁵ and keep the constant for the quantitative analysis.⁶

We describe the calibration of each time-varying model parameter in detail below, and report the relevant values in Table 2. Production function parameters are calculated to match the shares of sector output going to each type of input, as reported in our Input-Output data. The shares of consumer expenditures allocated to housing is set to the averages are reported in the CSY for rural (5%) and urban (95%) households. Agriculture's share of expenditures in the initial equilibrium Ψ^L is also from the data.

Some model parameters correspond to empirical elasticities and other moments in the data. We set their values to correspond to common values from the literature, and depend the sensitivity of our results to alternative values in the appendix. In particular, the elasticity of migration flows to real commodity differences κ is set to match the elasticity of 0.5 estimated by Fobbe and Zou (2009). Given our value for ϵ (described in the appendix), it implies $\kappa = 2.0$. The elasticity of trade flows with respect to trade costs θ is set to 2, which is evidence from literature. Following evidence from Fobbe (2015), we use the same elasticity for both the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. For the consumer preference parameters, we set the strength of the commodity and price effects in consumer expenditures to 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. The former is in line with Der et al. (2009) who finds $\epsilon \in (0.68, 0.76)$ for the United States across different time periods, but the latter is less precise. They also find values for ϵ in the UK (0.76), Canada (0.34), and Australia (0.3). There are other researchers who choose lower values for ϵ . For example, Boppart (2014) sets it to 0.22 and Eckert and Peters (2018) set it to 0.35. Clearly, although we do not rigorously estimate ϵ here, a regression of log-expenditures on log-commodity suggests a value between 0.8 and 1.0. We opt for 0.7. The value of γ is set to 0.3, close to Boppart (2014)'s estimate of 0.4 and Eckert and Peters (2018)'s of 0.32. We show that our results are robust to alternative values for ϵ and γ in the appendix. Finally, the oligopoly share of expenditure on agriculture ϕ is set to 0, which implies Eq. (23) with very little quantitative effect on our results, as we demonstrate in the appendix.

4.2. Migration cost

We first estimate the size of migration cost calibrations before quantifying its effect on growth, structural change, and regional convergence. Additionally, we compare our main results to a model with different preferences and to estimates based on alternative definitions of migration.

⁵ We use this approach to estimate the gaps in employment between the census and CSY. The Chinese population census and the NBS labor survey, the source of the employment data in CSY, use different survey methods in enumerating agriculture and non-agriculture employment. The census provides more accurate information about migration, but less accurate information on employment. We discuss this in more detail in the data appendix.

⁶ For robustness, we also report the results with registered workers calibrations for each five-year period in the appendix, and our main results do not change much.

Table 3
Average migration costs in China.

Year	Average cost				Relative to 2000		
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2005	2010	2015
Overall, including δ	3.96	3.59	2.90	2.7	0.9	0.73	0.55
Direct migration costs μ	.75	.63	.3	0.96	0.93	0.75	0.55
A							
Overall	2.68	2.23	.57	.04	0.83	0.58	0.39
With Provinces	2.25	.87	.32	0.87	0.83	0.59	0.39
Between Provinces	.38	9.55	5.95	4.88	0.84	0.52	0.43
B							
Overall	9.4	8.00	5.54	3.68	0.88	0.6	0.40
With agriculture	.6	3.48	0.62	4.99	.6	0.9	.29
With No agriculture	5.67	5.06	4.4	.92	0.89	0.73	0.34

Note: Displays the weighted-average migration cost for various years and various types of migration moves. The last three columns display the migration costs in each year relative to 2000. Migration costs displayed are exclusive of the foregone returns to additional capital that accrue only to non-migrants, except for the first row that includes this effect average.

4.2.1. Estimation

With the calibrated parameters and our data on real incomes, employment, registrations, and migration shares, we infer the functional form of bilateral migration costs between provinces and sectors. Specifically, we solve for the direct migration costs μ such that Eq. (24) holds, and from Eq. (23), we calculate the migration cost as follows:

$$\mu = \underbrace{\left(\frac{m}{m}\right)^{-1/\kappa}}_{\text{No effectivity and rebates}} = \underbrace{\frac{1/\epsilon - (\psi' - \alpha\phi)/\gamma}{\delta^{1/\epsilon} / \epsilon - (\psi' - \alpha\phi)/\gamma}}_{\text{Overall Cost}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{v}{v}\right)^{\epsilon} \left(\frac{m}{m}\right)^{-1/\kappa}}_{\text{Overall Cost}} \quad (26)$$

We use data on real GDP by province and sector to estimate real wages and additional capital rebates, using Eq. (20), and data on consumption shares by province and rural or urban area to estimate agricultural spending shares. With these estimates in hand, we report the resulting migration-weighted average migration costs in Table 3.

The average of the direct migration costs

was

of

Table 4
Effect of lower migration costs, 20





Table 5
Average migration costs in C i a (not etic preferences).

Year	Average cost				Relative to 2000		
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2005	2010	2015
Overall, including	5.86	5.00	3.73	2.47	0.85	0.64	0.42
Direct migration costs μ	3.02	2.5	.76	.09	0.83	0.58	0.36
A							
Overall	3.93	3.2	.89	.05	0.79	0.48	0.27
With Provinces	3.23	2.56	.56	0.85	0.79	0.48	0.26
Between Provinces	27.47	23.05	2.8	9.27	0.84	0.44	0.34
B							
Overall	25.43	2.89	2.93	7.68	0.86	0.5	0.30
With agriculture	43.42	49.87	35.65	54.3	.5	0.82	.25
With No agriculture	9.07	6.70	2.75	4.4	0.88	0.67	0.23

Note: Displays the weighted-average migration cost for various years and various types of migration moves. The last three columns display the migration costs in each year relative to 2000. Migration costs displayed are exclusive of the foregone return to a dad capita at accrue only to the migration costs, except for the first row that includes the average.

Table 6
Effect of lower migration costs, 2000–2015 (not etic preferences).

C	m	Five-year growth (%) for year ending			Cumulative effect
		2005	2010	2015	
Aggregate	ea GDP Growth	2.8	4.9	6.	4.4
Provincial	equity	−4.2	−3.8	−8.9	−33.0
Agriculture	employment share	−2.	−4.7	−7.7	−4.6
C	A N - , B -		M	C	
Aggregate	ea GDP Growth	.8	2.3	3.3	7.6
Provincial	equity	0.4	−3.	−6.8	−9.3
Agriculture	employment share	−.8	−3.	−6.	−.0
C	A N - , B -		M	C	
Aggregate	ea GDP Growth	.3	3.0	2.3	6.7
Provincial	equity	−4.6	−0.9	−2.9	−25.9
Agriculture	employment share	−0.8	−2.2	−2.0	−4.9

Note: Displays the effect of a given migration costs in each of the three five-year periods ending 2005, 2010, and 2015. The cumulative effects with the bar mode and not etic-preference mode are reported in the last two columns. A given aggregate migration costs affects the movement between agriculture and non-agriculture only. It is further decomposed into its within-province and between-province components. The regional equity is reported as the regional variation of regional GDP per worker across provinces. The regional agriculture's share of total employment is reported as the percentage of total employment.

Table 7
Intra-provincial worker migration in C i a, 2000–2015.

	Broad definition				Narrower definition			
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2000	2005	2010	2015
Total migration stock	0.5	32.6	76.2	25.7	2.8	5.4	27.3	33.5
Emigration (%)								
Total migrants	4.	7.8	22.9	28.0	.78	2.06	3.55	4.3
Out-to-No agriculture migrants	3.0	6.5	2.6	25.5	.73	2.02	3.50	4.25

Note: Displays the number of workers living and working outside their area of registration. The first row is in millions. The last two rows are shares of total employment.

or township, which suggest potentially large frictions to switching sectors locally. Our broad definition of migration captures the reduction in these frictions as a consequence of intra-provincial migration costs. Here we compare a rather strict definition of intra-provincial migration. Any worker who switches sectors within a province will be classified as a migrant worker only if the worker is outside their county of registration. For workers who migrate within their county of registration, we assume there is no explicit or implicit cost of switching sectors. That is, they can switch sectors without cost and are entitled to receive a dad capita income rebates from the sector they work in.

Table 7, we compare the migration stock under the new definition with those under our original definition. The intra-provincial migration decreases by around 85 percent compared to the broad definition. However, in the original definition,

Table 10

C a g e s i i t e r a a d e t e r a t r a d e c o s t s i C i a , 2002–20 2.

	E p o r t e r								
Porter	Nort - East	Beiji g- f'ia ji	Nort Coast	Ce tra Coast	Sout Coast	Ce tra egio	Nort - West	Sout - West	broad
Porter C	C	, 2002	2007						
Nort east	.00	0.90	0.93	0.95	. 2	.0	0.90	. 9	0.85
Beiji g/f'ia ji	0.90	.00	0.95	0.87	.0	0.92	0.82	.03	0.80
Nort Coast	0.93	0.95	.00	0.9	.06	0.98	0.87	.06	0.82
Ce tra Coast	0.94	0.87	0.90	.00	0.90	0.88	0.79	0.99	0.83
Sout Coast	. 2	.0	.06	0.9	.00	0.85	0.82	0.80	0.90
Ce tra egio	.00	0.92	0.97	0.88	0.84	.00	0.8] f'j	0.0 39 f'c /F	f'f 6.376 0 0 6.37676 w753 56

Table 13

Effect of capita et c a ges, 2000–20 5.

Five-year growt (%) for year e di g			Cumulative	ot etic
2005	20 0	20 5		

Table 14

Decomposition of C i a's growth, i come convergence, and structural change.

	Five-year change			Share of ve- year change (%)		
	2005	20 0	20 5	2005	20 0	20 5
A Δ GD / G (%)						
D	63.	65.0	36.3			
Overa	54.3	55.0	34.9	00.0	00.0	00.0
Productivity C a ges	38.4	5 .9	8.0	69.5	95.8	47.3
ter a trade Costs	8.3	– .8	–	5.9	–4.7	–
E ter a trade Costs	4.7	–0.	–	9.2	–0.4	–
Migration Costs	4.	5.5	6.5	8.0	0.6	20.3
Capita Wedges	0.5	–0.	–0.5	0.7	–0.	– .7
verage ea Capita Cost C a ges	– .7	–0.5	0.9	–3.3	– .2	34.
C A Em m ()						
D	–8.2	–8.	–8.4			
Overa	–5.	–8.4	–6.3	00.0	00.0	00.0
Productivity C a ges	– .6	–3.	.6	32.5	37.0	–24.6
ter a trade Costs	0.	0.2	–	– .6	–2.5	–
E ter a trade Costs	–0.3	0.0	–	5.7	–0.6	–
Migration Costs	–3.2	–5.6	–7.7	63.3	66.4	2 .
Capita Wedges	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	–0.2	0.5
verage ea Capita Cost C a ges	0.0	0.0	–0.2	–0.7	–0.	3.
C Δ GD / I (%)						
D	4.3	– .2	–3 .8			
Overa	0.9	– 2.0	–3 .9	00.0	00.0	00.0
Productivity C a ges	7.2	–2.	– 4.6	57.6	7.6	45.7
ter a trade Costs	6.3	–4.0	–	57.5	33.6	–
E ter a trade Costs	2.8	2.	–	26.0	– 7.7	–
Migration Costs	– 3.	– 4.2	– 8.	– 9.4	8.8	56.6
Capita Wedges	–2.4	6.2	0.8	–2 .9	–52.2	–2.6
verage ea Capita Cost C a ges	0.0	0.0	–0.	0.	–0.	0.3

Note: Displays the growth in C i a's aggregate real GDP and the change in agriculture's share of employment over the three five-year periods ending 2005, 20 0, and 20 5. Each row displays the marginal contribution to growth of each structural change in the trade costs, the trade costs, migration costs, capital wedges, and aggregate capital/output across a permutation of those changes. Changes in employment shares are the percentage point change in agriculture's share of total employment. Changes in provincial equity reflect the percentage change in the variance of log real GDP per worker.

increased significantly after its accession to WTO. Since 2005, and especially after 20 0, there had been convergence in FPP across provinces and sectors that also contributed to the decline in regional inequality.

5. Conclusion

Using unique and detailed data on production, employment, capital, trade, and migration, we decompose the various contributing factors behind C i a's growth, structural change, and convergence between 2000 and 20 5. In particular, by combining rich individual-level data on worker occupation and occupational decisions from 2000 to 20 5 with a spatial general equilibrium model of C i a's economy, we quantify the size and consequences of policy-driven reductions in migration costs. We find that between 2000 and 20 5 migration costs fell by 45%, with the cost of moving from agricultural rural areas to non-agricultural urban areas falling even more. Through a variety of quantitative exercises, we demonstrate that these migration cost changes account for the majority of the drop in regional inequality and the reallocation of workers out of agriculture. We compare the effect of migration policy changes with other important economic developments in C i a, including changes in trade costs, capital market distortions, aggregate capital cost reductions, and productivity. While each contributes meaningfully to growth, migration policy is central to C i a's structural change and regional convergence. We also find that a notably slower pace of between-sector and between-province migration after 20 0 and increasing regional credit provision and capital accumulation in general growth in recent years. Given the importance of migration to C i a's economic development, it is at

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