Political tie hot potato: The contingent effect of policy on cash and innovation anticorruption hin 's



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allocate investment resources efficiently in an energing market context. Adequate resources are essential for the de elopment of innovative projects, and can be tangible or intangible (Te e et al., 1997), internal or external (Park and Luo, 2001). Central to be resource-based view (RBV) is the notion that various resources ar

capabilities should be

tivities (e.g., Kotabe et al., 2017) address the challenges of weak legal institutions, which cannot be resolved by tangible f nancial resources (e. g., cash holding), is unclear. From a dynamic resource-based view (Foss and Ishikawa, 2007), the ability of a frm to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external resources can help ensure its

Available online 13 January 2022 0048-7333/© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved competitive advantage. However, no clear conceptual model has been developed to explain how various types of resources can be combined (e. g., Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) in the innovation process. In our study, we regard political ties as a type of external, intangible resource (Nee and Opper, 2010) and examine their moderating role in the relationship between cash holding and R&D investment and outcomes.

The cost and benef ts of building political connections have also been extensively explored. Strong evidence has been provided that f rms can use their political ties to improve their legitimacy and overcome the constraints imposed by weak institutions (Guo et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2017), but some studies f nd that political ties can be counterproductive (Boubakri et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007; Hadani and Schuler, 2013). We suggest that these mixed results (Wang et al., 2019) may be due to the political environment in which frms are embedded or to systematic environmental changes caused by signif cant national events (Yu et al., 2019), and this political context leads to a double-edged effect of political connections (Ge et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2012). Various theoretical frameworks have been used to identify the effects of national political institutions on political ties (Ge et al., 2019, Sun et al., 2012), and the contingent value of political connections when regimes change has also been acknowledged (e.g. Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Siegel, 2007). We specifically examine how firms in an emerging economy reallocate resources to protect themselves from the risks associated with political ties when a national anti-corruption campaign is implemented. The value of political ties has typically been examined at the organizational level (e.g., Dielemaß and Bokldewyn, 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Siegel, 2007), while the effects of policy changes at the national level have not been fully explored. Major political events (e.g., anti-corruption campaigns) can disrupt the status guo of political resources and may limit the "gray zone" of benef ts exchange through poBtical ties.

In this study, we examine the conditions under which a frm's political capital improves the eff ciency of their innovation activities by exploring the moderating effect of the anti-corruption policy in China. The 18théNational Contegress of the Communist Partgradific Chilina in 2012 introduced a nationwide anti-corruption campaign. This event had long lasting and signif cant effects on businesses in China and thus provides an invaluable opportunity to explore how frms respond to

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develop a research framework to test the combined effects of political connections and cash holding on innovation and also examine the contingent value of such connections (see Fig. 1). Thus, we examine the three-way interactive effect of cash holding, political ties, and the anti-corruption policy on R&D investment and R&D outcomes, respectively.

2.2. Cash holding and R&D

From a resource-based perspective, a f rm is considered a historically determined collection of various resources (Wernerfelt, 1984) which are semi-permanently tied to its innovation strategies. In the RBV, fully appropriable resources such as physical assets are distinguished from cash reserves, which are more f nancially f exible (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). Cash held in excess of a frm's transactional needs represents a form of organizational slack, and although this can benef t innovation, it depends on the types of resources made available. Absorbed types of slack such as excess capacity or personnel are not easily converted into useful resources without signif cant friction (for example, a requirement for software engineers cannot be quickly addressed by transferring underutilized hardware engineers). However, slack in the form of cash is fully fungible and readily convertible, and thus cash holding is particularly relevant when analyzing how frms' innovation choices may be related to slack. Intangible capital cannot typically be pledged as collateral, so large f rms prefer to f nance innovation through internal funds (Falato et al., 2013) as cash can be used without delay. Thus, f rms with suff cient cash holding are more likely to make R&D investments as securing external funds may not always be successful (Brown and Petersen, 2011).

Cash represents a unique type of f nancial slack and thus can help address latent conf icts between internal political coalitions and provide relief in control mechanisms (Cyert and March 1963). The level of slack within a f rm and the R&D costs will likely be assessed when making R&D investment decisions, commensurate with the extent of the investment and whether internal or external resources are required (Lyandres and Palazzo, 2016). Firms that hold slack are protected from the uncertainty of innovation and are thus more likely to pursue innovative projects in general (Bourgeois, 1981). They can also take on risky R&D projects that cannot be easily justif ed in terms of explicit returns (Levinthal and March 1981), and managers will be more willing to take risks if a f rm has some slack and is relatively weal thy (Bromiley, 1991). However, if there is no slack, failure will have extremely damaging consequences, and managers will be more risk-averse and make more conservative decisions (March and Shapira, 1987).

The motivation to hold corporate cash as a precaution is greater in an emerging market such as China as cash becomes an important buffer against the adverse cash f ow shocks that can arise in a weak institutional environment (Duchin, 2010). Firms may choose to forgo promising innovation projects when faced with cash f ow shortfalls because they are more sensitive to investment expenditure under weak legal institutions and a lack of intellectual property protection (Kusnadi and Wei, 2011). Slack therefore provides a cushion for R&D failure and the impact of the external environment, thus stimulating innovative activity (Jeffrey et al., 2010). We argue that as cash holding is immediately available and completely fungible, it provides a greater safety net and make managers more likely to invest in risky innovation projects.

Hypothesis 1a. A larger cash holding enables more R&D investment.

A frm's cash holding may positively affect its R&D investment and capacity to produce new and superior products Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) suggest that due to "capital market imperfections, the f ow of internal f nance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small, high-tech f rms acquire technology through R&D." Suff cient internal f nancial slack enables more R&D investment and a greater absorptive capacity, which is associated with R&D outcomes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Firms holding more cash are also more likely to have access to the latest technologies and assimilate novel ideas into their own R&D activities As innovation is a knowledge-intensive process, we can therefore expect that the higher levels of external knowledge acquisition resulting from cash R&D investment will be associated with more effective R&D outcomes

Investment in R&D is strongly correlated with positive R&D outcomes (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2000), and Pandit et al. (2011) f nd a positive relationship between R&D investment and outcomes (in the form of patent counts and citations), although not all f rms producing innovative output apply for patents. Schroth and Szalay (2010) demonstrate that f rms holding more cash than other f rms are more likely to win patent races. In addition, f rms with suff cient cash do not need to release propriety information about their innovative projects to raise public funds for R&D investment, and thus do not risk revealing valuable information to their competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). We therefore suggest that a f rm's cash holding encourages investment in R&D, provides more opportunities to develop knowledge associated with innovation, and reduces the risks of patent competition, all of which lead to superior R&D outcomes.

Hypothesis 1b. A larger cash holding enables better R&D outcomes.

2.3. The moderating role of political ties

Political connections can be considered as essential and f exible resources (Nee and Opper, 2010), and in China, unlike in other more developed economies, they have for many years played a unique role in corporate operations (Gao et al., 2017; Peng and Luo, 2000). In China's transitioning economy, political connections can make up for institutional inadequacies (Xin and Pearce, 1996), a lack of support for innovation, and moral hazards (e.g., contract breaking, violation of intellectual property rights), and can provide access to favorable resources and enable benef cial policies to be discussed (Musacchio et al.,




Fig. 1. Research framework.

2015). Chinese f rms must depend on the government for important information and resources (Shi et al., 2014, 2017), and in terms of innovation, institutional voids in the capital markets severely constrain a f rm's motivation and ability to invest in risky projects (Chen et al., 2014). Building political ties is thus often necessary for addressing the institutional uncertainties during the f rm innovation process (Zhou et al., 2017).

Given the importance of political capital in transitional economies, managers may be motivated to establish connections with government off cials via gift-giving, favors, or other methods that are legal but fall into a "gray area," or even through bribery (Shirokova and McDou-gall-Covin, 2012). Wealthy business managers are more likely to be targets of corruption because they frequently interact with government off cials (Rose and Peiffer, 2013). However, a potential drawback of relying on political ties is that f rms often use resources such as cash to bribe valuable members within their political network (Xu et al., 2019). The competitive environments and ineff cient resource allocation in emerging economies (Venard, 2009) can lead business owners to resort to such non-market actions (including corruption, bribery, and lobbying) through their political connections, with the aim of improving their competitive position in innovation compared with their rivals (Capron and Chatain, 2008).

Although such unethical practices drain f rm resources and also create unbalanced power dynamics within the external business environment, political ties still have signif cant value in emerging economies (Peng and Luo, 2000). The navigating of fragmented and often incomplete institutions and the government's preference for innovative activities (Chen et al., 2014) lead us to argue that the benef ts of political ties in the Chinese context far outstrip the potential negative issues. These benef ts include preferential treatment in incentive programs, the acquisition of unique resources, obtaining rich and reliable information, and the legitimization of investments, and thus it is well worth the risks of unethical behavior to ensure that f rms retain their favorable status among key players in their network.

Thus, political ties contribute to the positive effects cash holding has on innovation in several ways. First, favorable treatment from the government can include the provision of timely and in-depth information regarding beneficial innovation policies, financial subsidies, tax preference, and cheaper government-controlled bank loans (Hillman, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000; Yu et al., 2016), which reduce the cost of holding cash and the risks of investing cash in R&D. Second, politically connected firms are more capable of reducing the environmental uncertainties in China (Xin and Pearce, 1996), and thus more equipped to deal with the uncertainties of innovation projects and more confident about the returns on the cash investment. In an emerging market context, political ties reduce the dampening effect of policy uncertainty on cash investment and innovative activities. For example, the interpretation and application of laws regarding innovation activities are often unclear, and some frms have reported that the complexity and ambiguity of regulations is one of the biggest roadblocks to innovation in China (Zhu et al., 2012). Without such ties, simple permit applications or patent flings can be rejected after years of waiting, which increases the time cost of innovative projects. Politically connected firms will thus be more confident about the security of their R&D cash spending as they will face fewer barriers created by arbitrary government interventions concerning innovation (Peng and Luo, 2000; Shi et al., 2014). Political ties also enable frms to overcome malpractice problems and institutional obstacles during innovation processes (e.g., Wu, 2011), thus providing a more stable environment for cash investment on R&D. We therefore argue that politically connected frms with f nancial slack are more likely to invest in R&D with greater conf dence and less concerns than those with few or no political ties.

Hypothesis 2a. A firm's political ties positively moderate the relationship between cash holding and R&D investment.

As mentioned above, political ties can improve a frm's fnancial

standing, promote knowledge exchange, and increase access to new technologies (Guan and Liu, 2016), which leads to better innovation performance (Wang et al., 2018). Political ties also enable f rms to absorb and exploit innovation-related resources from other external networks more effectively (Li et al., 2018), such as complementary technological resources (Walsh et al., 2009), through collaborative relationships with other organizations (e.g., public universities and research institutes). We therefore suggest that political ties are essential social capital that can positively inf uence f rms' innovation capabilities and facilitate the conversion of cash to R&D outcomes (Gao et al., 2017). They can also help f rms protect their R&D output by discouraging imitation and unfair competition (Sheng et al., 2011; Zhao, 2006). Thus, we propose that:

Hypothesis 2b. A firm's political ties positively moderate the relationship between cash holding and R&D outcomes.

2.4. Politically well-connected or political hot potato? The effect of anticorruption efforts

2.4.1. Institutional pressure: the efficiency motivation behind anticorruption policy

Management scholars have long argued that institutions signif cantly shape all types of frm behavior (Shi et al., 2017). To survive and prosper, f rms must react and adapt to the pressures of the institutional constraints that surround them (Dacin et al., 2007). Although f rms with political ties are typically more likely to reduce the level of institutional uncertainty surrounding their innovation activities, it is unclear how such ties will affect their innovation decisions when major political events change the institutional environment. We follow the literature on the mixed effects of political capital and the contingent effect of political ties (Wang and Chung, 2013; Wu and Chen, 2012), and argue that aspects of the nonmarket environment, such as the institutional environment and national systems, play a key role in clarifying the effect of political ties during the innovation process. Although exogenous shocks (e.g., the sudden death of an associated politician, regime change) have been used to explore this issue from a frm's perspective (Fung et al., 2015; Siegel, 2007), changes to the institutional environment at the national level have not been fully considered.

Corruption has been a central political and social issue for many decades in China (Wedeman, 2004). When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, a systematic nationwide campaign against corruption came into effect. This was viewed as a major policy shift and a strong signal of long-term government commitment against corruption (Qian and Wen, 2015). As the campaign progresses, businesses adapt to the changing institutional environment and adjust their behaviors accordingly. Although f rms have long enjoyed the benef ts of political resources and have engaged in more innovation investment in response (Stilgoe et al., 2013), such benef ts are undoubtedly impacted by the anti-corruption policy, especially when a key focus of the campaign is resource utilization efficiency.

2.4.2. Three-way interaction effects on R&D investment

Under the political climate of the anti-corruption campaign, political connections are suddenly in the spotlight, and thus the accompanying improvement in the legal system diminishes the value of political connections (Shi et al., 2014). The anti-corruption campaign in China also requires full compliance and has led to the sudden dissolving of many political ties. Over 182,000 party off cials at all levels of government were investigated and/or arrested by the end of 2013, including 43 at the vice-minister level or above (Pan and Tian, 2017). Bribes are typically viewed as a quick way to establish political connections in transitional economies (Boubakri et al., 2008; Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007). Firms engaging in corrupt behavior may lose their target politicians after the crackdown, thus losing the benef ts of

stock prices of companies with political connections fall signif cantly when the government's ability to provide privileges and subsidies is affected by external shocks. The ongoing anti-corruption campaign signif cantly reduces the price subsidies that politically connected f rms receive when purchasing land from local government (Chen and Kung, 2019). We therefore argue that the economic benef ts of political connections such as reduced taxation, the lower cost of government-controlled bank loans, and government subsidies may suddenly terminate (Hao et al., 2020), which in turn increase the f nancial pressure on R&D investment.

Well-connected frms also become more sensitive about their cash investments because their political connections become a "hot potato" when the anti-corruption campaign is in full force. Corrupt dealings between government off cials and business executives have been primary targets of the anti-corruption campaign (Hao et al., 2020). Unlike f rms without political connections, those with political connections are intrinsically at risk because the politicians that they are deeply involved with can be investigated at any moment and charged with corruption, which then leads the investigations back to the businesses. Politically connected f rms thus become more risk-averse in terms of R&D investment and more likely to hold onto cash after the anti-corruption campaign. Studies indicate that f rms entangled in corruption scandals drastically reduce their cash investment expenditures immediately after corrupt government off cials are ousted (Pan and Tian, 2017). Smith (2016) also f nds that f rms located in more corrupt areas hold less cash than those in less corrupt areas. Firms involved in corruption scandals are also more sensitive about their cash expenditure, including R&D investment (Pan and Tian, 2017). Politically connected frms tend to decrease their cash spending on R&D investment to reduce the risks of being investigated under the anti-corruption campaign. Thus, we argue that the anti-corruption policy signif cantly weakens the f nancial benef ts of political ties and makes managers more risk-averse in terms of cash investment in R&D, which in turn reduces the positive moderating effects of political connections.

Hypothesis 3a. Anti-corruption policy reduces the positive moderating effect of political ties on the relationship between cash holding and R & D investment.

2.4.2. Three-way interaction effects on R&D outcome

The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2020 submitted an agenda to achieve the dual goals of government integrity and effciency (Krammer and Jiménez, 2020), thus indicating the eff ciency-seeking logic behind the anti-corruption campaign. The political ties of Chinese frms are widely held to change the fow of government f nancial subsidies and reduce their eff ciency (Guo and Du, 2011). Before the anti-corruption campaign, politically connected frms often lacked incentives to pursue eff ciency-based innovative activities and instead simply fulf lled administrative tasks (e.g., establishing the investment ratio of R&D) (Ramamurti, 2000). Chen and Wu (2011) also argue that when a f rm depends on its political connections to achieve its competitive goals, it no longer has a strong motivation to focus on improving innovation effciency. Although the anti-corruption campaign does not target frms' specific connections, it ties the hands of government off cials and strips them of the discretionary political power that benefits the connected firms (Wang et al., 2018). Politically connected f rms under the scrutiny and pressure of the anti-corruption campaign are particularly motivated to turn R&D investment into actual outcomes because they are more obliged to meet the government' expectations and objectives (Pan and Tian, 2017; Sun et al., 2010). Consistent with the institutional view, if they are to survive and prosper, well-connected f rms must comply with the eff ciency-driven motivation behind the anti-corruption campaign (Dacin et al., 2007). The eff ciency logic of resource utilization refers to the degree to which resource input is transformed into product output (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Shleifer, 1998), and thus we suggest that managers in politically

connected f rms have shifted their focus from simple investment ratios to producing actual innovation outcomes

The anti-corruption campaign enhances information transparency and helps to ensure that rules are enforced, enabling the investment decisions and actions of politically connected leaders (e.g., members of the party) to be tracked (Bertot et al., 2010). Government off cials who have the power to allocate valuable political resources (e.g., subsidies, preferential tax, and government contracts) no longer enjoy the conditions necessary for rent-seeking and are under pressure to make policies more transparent. They should thus allocate political resources based on corporate efficiency or social welfare rather than personal contacts. Thus, the anti-corruption policy blocks rent-seeking channels, which in turn motivates connected firms to use their existing resources more efficiently. The levels of information disclosure and procedural transparency increase, so business leaders with political ties must consider how every innovation dollar is spent instead of simply spending a specif ed amount (Pan and Tian, 2017).

The anti-corruption policy encourages politically connected f rms to legally and eff ciently access new technologies and increase their innovative capabilities via political networks (Guan and Liu, 2016; Wang et al., 2018). It also reduces the incentives of managers of politically connected f rms (e.g., state-owned f rms) to misuse R&D investment for personal gain, which leads to spending ineff ciencies (Zhou et al., 2017). The anti-corruption campaign may therefore make political ties more effective in terms of the relationship between cash holding and R&D outcomes

Hypothesis 3b. The anti-corruption policy enhances the positive moderating effect of political ties on the relationship between cash holding and R&D outcomes.

3. Methods

3.1. Sample and data

To test our hypotheses, we constructed a longitudinal data set of Chinese listed f rms from the period between 2007 and 2016. The f nal sample of 18,125 f rm-year observations comprises all f rms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. These f rms are located in 22 provinces of 4 municipalities within 5 autonomous regions of mainland China, excluding the Special Administrative Regions (i.e., Hong Kong and Macau). Our data are obtained from the CSMAR database, which is the primary source of information on Chinese stock markets and the f nancial statements of China's exchange-listed f rms. The primary data source for identifying f rms' innovation investment and cash holding is CSMAR's China Stock Market Financial Information database. Data on frms' political ties are retrieved from China Listed Firm's Corporate Governance Research database. In addition, we hand-coded data on the anti-corruption campaign from the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Procuratorial Yearbooks of China, published by the Supreme People's Procuratorate of China. All these databases are commonly used in other research on Chinese f rms (e.g., Sun et al., 2016; Wang and Qian, 2011).

Table 1 provides the sample distribution information. In our sample, 18.108% of companies belong to high-technology industries (e.g., Pharmaceuticals, Computing machinery, Radio, TV, and Communications equipment) (OECD, 2003). As Table 1 shows, frms in high-tech industries invest more money on R&D and obtain more patents than those in low-tech industries Approximately 14.946% of the frms engage in regulated industries in China. A large proportion of our sample (41.043%) consists of frms located in the East China Region (i. e., Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Shandong provinces) whereas only 5.997% of the frms are located in the Northwest China Region (i.e., Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang provinces). The East remains China's economic powerhouse and accounts for more than half of the country's GDP. The average age of frms

Table 1

Sample distribution.

A. Industry distribution of the sample firms	Firm size	Firm age	R D input	R D output	Freq	%
Companies belong to high- tech industries	7.518	14.360	0.027	23.839	3282	18.108
Companies belong to low- tech industries	7.567	15.103	0.009	7.614	14,843	81.892
Companies belong to regulated industries	7.479	14.942	0.017	11.790	2709	14.946
Companies belong to unregulated industries	7.569	14.974	0.011	10.334	15,416	85.054
B. Year						
distribution of						
the sample						
firms						
2007	7.295	11.718	0.003	6.493	1334	7.360
2008	7.333	12.277	0.006	6.951	1449	7.994
2009	7.355	12.924	0.009	8.891	15	151114.333

in our sample is around 14 years.

3.2. Measurements

3.2.1. Dependent variables

The two dependent variables in our research framework are R&D investment and R&D outcome. Following the literature (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Hillier et al., 2011), R&D investment is the ratio of a f rm's R&D expenditure to total assets in year *t* adjusted by subtracting median industry-level R&D expenditures to size in the same year. Following other studies (Tan et al., 2014; Tong et al., 2014), we use the number of invention patent applications to measure R&D outcome.

3.2.2. Independent variable

Following Dittmar et al. (2003) and Harford et al. (2008), we use

f rms' cash ratio, def ned as the amount of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets net of cash and cash equivalents, as our independent variable.

3.2.3. Moderating variables

3.2.3.1. Political ties. Following other studies on frm-level political ties (Haveman et al., 2017), we use two methods to measure political embeddedness (1) a binary indicator variable set to one in years when subtains $\frac{1}{10}$ in $\frac{1}{10}$ 7azpexeczytisaescollirector of the focal frm has served as the chief off cer or deputy chief off cer at the division level or above, and zero otherwise (Faccio, 2006; Hillman, 2005); and (2) a variable that measures the proportion of executives and directors who have political experience. 2B13 324 states for the second seco executive has current or former political experience, and O otherwise. A director is deemed to have political experience if she or he is a current member of a Chinese legislative body (i.e., the National People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) or was a government off cial before joining the company (Sun et al., 2016). ####For the second measurement, we measure a company's political ties using the percentage of all directors on the board who have political experience (Sun et al., 2016).

3.2.3.2. Anti-corruption policy. The nationwide anti-corruption campaign in China was implemented at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party when President Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012. In 2013, the Commissions for Discipline Inspection (CDIs) investigated more than 30,000 Party off cials nationwide for violations of the Eight Provisions and applied disciplinary sanctions to 7600 (Li, 2019). For example, Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee and head of China's security agencies, was placed under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) for abuse of power and corruption in late 2013. The CDIs were established by the government to enforce the internal rules of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and to combat the corruption and malfeasance of government off cials. The CCDI represents the highest internal control institution of the CPC and is considered the main anti-corruption body in China. Local CDI levels were established in provinces, cities, and towns.

The CDI's anti-corruption process consists of the following steps (Nie and Wang, 2016). First, the CDI acts to discover and investigate any government off cials that have committed malfeasance and then implements formal investigative procedures; second, it determines the penalties according to the disciplinary rules of the CPC and if necessary, forwards the evidence gathered to the procuratorates (Xu and Yano, 2017). The suspects are then charged, and the criminal cases of corruption and bribery are moved to court. Finally, sentences are pronounced by the court. To target a wider range of conduct that involves the abuse of state power for private gain, such as bribery and embezzlement, the government has increased the number of CDI off ces in the provinces. More than 230 off ces of the CDI have been established in mainland China, an increase of 35.9% since the start of the anti-corruption campaign at the end of 2012. Table 2 shows the number of CDI off ces in 31 provinces of China before and after the campaign's inception.

We use two methods to measure the changes to the political environment caused by the anti-corruption campaign: (1) the increase in the number of provincial CDIs since the anti-corruption policy was announced at the end of 2012, and (2) the number of government off cials investigated in cases of corruption in the provinces each year. The CDI is central to the anti-corruption campaign (Li, 2019), so we suggest that the increased number of CDI off ces in provinces refects the government's anti-corruption efforts and intensity at the provincial level, which gives a direct and appropriate measurement of political environment change in China. Meanwhile, to measure the overall extent of

4. Results

Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the full sample. The average f rm is 14 years old, has 5645 employees, and reports 5558.44 million yuan in sales. As expected, a f rm's cash holding has a positive relationship with R&D investment (r = 0.057, p < 0.01). Anti-corruption policy has a negative relationship with cash holding (r = -0.046, p < 0.01). Following the rule of thumb that severe multicollinearity requires a correlation greater than 0.8 (e.g., Farrar and Glauber, 1967: 98), we find no severe multicollinearity among our variables.

Table 4 presents our f xed-effects hierarchical regression results from measuring political ties as a dummy variable and anti-corruption policy as the increase in the number of CDI off ces at the provincial level. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes only the control variables, while Models 2–4 include our explanatory variables. The increasing values of adjusted R-squared and signif cant F tests for Models 2–4 together suggest that adding our explanatory variables improves the model f t over the baseline Model 1.

Hypothesis 1a predicts that a f rm's cash holding positively affects its R&D investment. As Model 1a in Table 4 shows, f rms' cash holding has a positive and signif cant effect on R&D investment ($\beta = 0.067$, p < 0.001). Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported. Hypothesis 1b predicts that f rms' cash holding positively affects R&D outcome. Model 1b in Table 4 shows that f rms' cash holding has a positive but insignif cant effect on R&D outcome ($\beta = 9.051$, n.s.) Thus, Hypothesis 1b is not supported.

Hypothesis 2a proposes that a f rm's political ties positively moderate the positive relationship between cash holding and R&D investment. As Model 3a in Table 4 shows, the interaction effect between cash holding and political ties is positive and signif cant ($\beta = 0.155$, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2b proposes that a f rm's political ties positively moderate the relationship between cash holding and R&D outcome. Model 3b in Table 4 shows that the interaction effect between cash holding and political ties is positive and signif cant ($\beta = 22.419$, p < 0.05). To further understand the moderating effects of political ties, we plot a two-way interaction in Fig. 2. Thus, Hypothesis 2a and 2b are supported.

Hypothesis 2a predicts a three-way interaction of cash holding, political ties, and anti-corruption policy on R&D investment. As Model 4a in Table 4 shows, the three-way interaction term is negative and signif cantly related to R&D investment ($\beta = -0.210$, p < 0.05). We then conduct simple slope tests to further conf rm our f ndings. We f nd that cash holding is positively related to R&D investment for f rms that have political ties before the anti-corruption policy's implementation. Thus, the positive effect of cash holding on R&D investment is strongest when f rms have political ties in a more corrupt environment. The graph of the three-way interaction (Fig. 36) further conf rms this f noting. The v . lorted.

m a) . othesis

Means, standard deviations, and correlation.

					-		_		_	-	
Variables	Mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Firm size (log employees)	7.56	1.43	1.000								
2. Sales(log sales)	8.64	1.82	0.347***	1.000							
3. Firm age	14.12	36.63	-0.048***	-0.221***	1.000						
4. Capital	32.24	1137.74	0.014*	-0.011	-0.023***	1.000					
5. Advertising	0.01	0.02	0.042***	-0.010	0.070***	0.000	1.000				
6. Tobin's Q	5.41	379.26	-0.037***	-0.017**	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	1.000			
7. Altman's Z	10.70	546.20	-0.039***	-0.034***	-0.003	0.000	0.000	-0.115***	1.000		
8. Duality	0.19	0.42	-0.072***	-0.053***	-0.051***	-0.004	0.024***	-0.003	-0.001	1.000	
9. Blockholder ownership	35.67	15.59	0.189***	0.122***	-0.187***	0.015*	-0.010	-0.007	-0.004	-0.069***	1.000
10.SOE	26.42	41.12	0.120***	0.119***	-0.095***	0.015**	-0.068***	-0.005	-0.008	-0.131***	0.192***
11. Earthquake	0.10	0.30	-0.009	-0.042***	0.034***	-0.002	-0.012	-0.003	-0.004	-0.042***	-0.036***
12. GDP	4.29	0.37	0.065***	-0.028***	0.094***	-0.001	0.081***	-0.010	-0.008	0.108***	-0.010
13.R&D outcome	21.39	168.37	0.145***	0.068***	-0.006	-0.002	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	0.005	0.022***
14. R&D investment	0.01	0.10	-0.028***	-0.006	-0.017**	-0.003	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.009	-0.005
15. Cash holding	0.15	0.13	-0.120***	-0.037***	-0.106***	0.028***	0.053***	0.054***	0.032***	0.059***	-0.001
16. Political tie	0.08	0.14	0.052***	-0.007	-0.009	0.044***	-0.015**	-0.005	-0.005	0.071***	0.019**
17. Anti-corruption	1.62	2.54	0.073***	-0.099***	0.188***	0.007	0.091***	-0.008	0.008	0.022***	-0.042***
	Mean	S.D.	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
10.SOE	26.42	41.12	1.000								
11. Earthquake	26.42	41.12	0.038***	1							
12. GDP	0.10	0.30	-0.245***	-0.333***	1						
13.R&D outcome	21.39	168.37	0.000	-0.018**	0.035***	1.000					
14. R&D investment	0.01	0.10	-0.011	-0.004	0.016**	0.012	1.000				
15. Cash holding	0.15	0.13	-0.054***	-0.026***	0.030***	-0.011	0.057***	1.000			
16. Political tie	0.08	0.14	-0.034***	0.030***	0.064***	0.007	-0.003	0.027***	1.000		
17. Anti-corruption	1.62	2.54	-0.102***	0.015**	0.199***	0.004	0.000	-0.046***	0.031***	1.000	

Superscripts indicate signif cance at the $^+$ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 level.

industry, Tobin's Q, blockholder ownership, and advertising expenditures. We then use the propensity score to perform a one-to-one matching, resulting in 4051 pairs of matched f rms. Such a matched sample removes any differences between the two groups of f rms other than political capital and ensures comparability between them. We then re-run the analysis and the results are highly consistent with the f ndings for the whole sample.

In addition, a concern regarding the causal effect of cash holding is that unobserved or omitted variables may correlate with both cash holding and frm innovation. This positive association may also be driven by reverse causality, in which a larger level of innovation investment may result in a greater demand for holding cash. We address these concerns by adopting the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system (Arellano and Bover, 1995). This technique has the advantages of addressing both endogeneity problems and f xed effects in addition to removing dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). Thus, the approach enables us to consider the dynamic effect of cash holding on innovation by including the effect of past innovation activities, and also to control for frm-level unobservable heterogeneity by including frm f xed effects. We test the relationship between cash holding, political ties, the anti-corruption policy, and innovation activities over the period of 2007-2016 using the GMM technique. The results show that the effect of cash holding on R&D investment is positive and signif cant ($\beta = 0.192$, p < 0.001). The interaction effect of political ties and cash holding on R&D investment is also positive and signif cant ($\beta = 0.348$, p < 0.001), while the three-way interaction effect of cash holding, political ties, and anti-corruption policy is negative and signif cant on R&D investment (β = -0.503, p < 0.001), and positive and signif cant on R&D outcome (β = 128.935, p < 0.05). The main results of the previous section are again supported.

We also conduct several additional tests to check the different effects of cash holding, political ties, and anti-corruption policy on innovation in regulated versus unregulated industries. We run f xed-effect models using a split-sample approach to examine the variance in results between these industries. Following the literature (e.g., Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005; Sun et al., 2016), we measure the signif cance of government regulation for the sample f rms based on their two-digit sector categorization. If a f rm belongs to Petrochemical, Pharmaceutical, Metallurgical, or Machinery industries, we consider it a regulated company. The results of the f xed-effects regression models are consistent. We f nd that the moderating effect of political ties on the positive relationship between cash holding and R&D investment is more signif cant in regulated industries with more asymmetrical information, and when the government has control over key resources. This f nding is consistent with our argument that political ties help f rms deal with environmental uncertainties and supplement their existing internal resources (e.g., cash holding), and in turn their conf dence regarding their R&D investment decisions is enhanced.

We then run regressions using two randomly selected subsamples (85%) from the total observations, as suggested by Li et al. (2010), and f nd that our results remain consistent with those using the full sample. We then examine the relationship between cash holding and R&D investment and outcome with and without political connections, respectively. The relationship between cash holding and R&D investment ($\beta = 0.250$, p < 0.001) is signif cant and positive when f rms are politically connected. We then examine the moderating effect of f rms' political connections on the relationship between cash holding and R&D investment/outcome before and after the implementation of the anti-corruption policy. The relationship between cash holding and R&D investment ($\beta = 0.363$, p < 0.001) is signif cant and positive before the implementation of the policy. Again, these results confirm our hypotheses ¹

5. Discussion

Innovation has become increasingly important for businesses in emerging markets, and thus any frm capabilities and managerial behaviors that infuence R&D activities deserve attention. Thus, we examine how a frm's cash holding affects its level of innovation, and the contingent roles of political ties and the anti-corruption policy. Our results conf rm that cash holding as a fungible type of f nancial slack has a positive relationship with innovation investment, which suggest that

¹ All regression results for the additional robustness checks are available upon request.

f rms in the emerging market context initiate or intensify their innova




Fig. 2. Interaction of Cash holding and Political ties on frm's R&D.

punishment associated with corruption becomes more severe, which signif cantly reduces the returns of expropriation for corrupt bureaucrats. This in turn reduces the uncertainty and transaction costs associated with innovation. Anti-corruption efforts thus contribute to fostering the institutional trust that proves to be necessary for the development of innovation and entrepreneurial activities." The campaign can contribute to leveling the playing f eld in the long run and promote healthier competition, which will increase the speed at which emerging markets such as China transition to a market economy.

5.1. Theoretical implications

Our findings provide novel insights into the roles of cash holding, political ties, and the anti-corruption policy in firm innovation in an emerging market, and thus make several contributions to the literature. First, we integrate both innovation investment and outcomes as two distinct dependent variables into our research framework to examine the roles of financial and political resources during the innovation process, and thus offer new insights into the relationship between investment and outcomes Although many studies have investigated the effects of various resources on innovation (e.g., Hoegl et al., 2008), their measurements of innovation either consider the R&D investment amount or R&D outcomes (e.g., Wu, 2011; Yu et al., 2016). We suggest this can lead to mixed f ndings on the relationship between resources and innovation. Distinguishing R&D investment from the outcome, and exploring the effects of various resources, can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the innovation process and the relationship between resources and innovation.

Second, our findings highlight the unique characteristic of cash holding. This represents a powerful form of fungible internal resource that can be used to address the institutional voids associated with innovation in China, thus contributing to the literature on resource slack and firm behavior in emerging markets (e.g., Pinkowitz et al., 2013). Although some economists link cash holding with high-tech industries (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2011), we extend their studies by incorporating management theories to explain the mechanisms underlying such relationships. From the RBV and institutional theory perspective, we argue that cash holding as financial slack has significant positive effects




Fig. 3. Three-way Interaction Effects of Cash holding, Political ties, and Anti-corruption on Firm's R&D.

on R&D investment and outcomes in an emerging market like China, because it improves f rms' abilities to shield against the risks inherent in R&D and a weak legal environment (e.g., Kusnadi and Wei, 2011). We stress that not all resources contribute equally to a f rm's R&D, but that high cash reserves in particular increase the ability to undertake high-risk and potentially prof table investments and reduce the sensitivity of investment expenditure (Almeida et al., 2004). Firms in an emerging market are more likely to be f nancially constrained (due to greater exposure to capital market imperfections) and are expected to accumulate cash to safeguard against R&D investment requirements.

Third, by exploring the interaction effects of cash holding and political ties on R&D investment and outcomes, we argue that political ties in the emerging market context are an important external intangible resource, which supplement frms' internal f nancial resources and contribute to innovation. Thus, we extend the research framework of RBV by combining analyses of the internal resources of f rms (e.g., cash holding) with the external institutional environment (e.g., Priem and Butler, 2001; Barney, 2001). By combining f nancial and political capital, f rms can address both their potential f nancial constraints (Almeida et al., 2004) and the weaker legal protection of emerging economies (Musacchio et al., 2015), which in turn leads to increased investor conf dence and motivation for R&D investment. We extend the traditional RBV perspective and argue that f rms in emerging economies can leverage the value of their own resources by accessing complementary resources through political alliances. Our findings further conf rm the dynamic resource-based view and emphasize the importance of combining resources to adapt to the institutional environment and address associated changes (e.g., Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).

We also provide empirical evidence of the effect political ties have on f rm innovation behavior and how both innovation investment and outcomes are contingent on institutional environment change. By exploring the contingent effect of the anti-corruption policy on political ties, we reveal the double-edged effects of these ties on innovation and thus the key contingencies related to the associations among the anticorruption campaign, political ties, resource allocation, and innovation efficiency in an emerging market. Although Sun and colleagues (2012) provide a theoretical framework of the contingent value of corporate political ties and emphasize the importance of the national political system, they do not examine how a change to the national political environment affects f rms' integration of resources Although

Fixed-effects regression model of cashing holding and R&D (Political tie=measurement 1; Anti-corruption=measurement 2).

Variable					DV: R D output			
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b
Control Variables								
Firm size	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	2.311*	2.126*	2.177*	2.149*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(1.069)	(0.855)	(0.856)	(0.856)
Firm age	-0.010	0.006	0.008	0.010	3.728	0.377	0.261	-1.276
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(11.293)	(9.135)	(9.138)	(9.144)
Capital	-0.034	-0.023	-0.012	0.005	-84.867	-92.929	-88.861	-100.261
	(0.291)	(0.290)	(0.289)	(0.289)	(223.508)	(175.580)	(175.570)	(175.487)
Advertising	-0.059	-0.062	-0.057	-0.054	-42.913	6.278	6.846	5.980
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(31.654)	(24.755)	(24.754)	(24.743)
Tobin's Q	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.990	1.010	1.123	1.075
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(17.156)	(13.553)	(13.551)	(13.545)
Altman's Z	-0.000	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.297	0.822	0.479	-0.825
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(11.959)	(9.571)	(9.571)	(9.603)
Duality	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.454	3.176 ⁺	3.206+	3.301+
5	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.363)	(1.862)	(1.863)	(1.862)
Blockholder Ownership	-4.582***	-4.244***	-4.137**	-4.049**	-667.162	-675.166	-651.180	-686.971
	(1.287)	(1.285)	(1.282)	(1.281)	(982.784)	(777.871)	(777.840)	(777.730)
State ownership	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-1.313	-2.091	-2.055	-1.878
·	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(2.242)	(1.775)	(1.775)	(1.775)
Natural disaster	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	-0.063	0.631	0.669	0.757
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(3.605)	(2.833)	(2.833)	(2.832)
GDP	0.007	0.002	0.001	0.002	8.371	-33.266	-33.579	-29.759
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(25.429)	(20.481)	(20.479)	(20.568)
Main effects	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,
Cash holding		0.067***	0.068***	0.066***		9.051	9.413	10.747+
5		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)		(5.732)	(5.734)	(5.746)
Political tie		()	0.005+	0.004		()	-1.685	-1.505
			(0.003)	(0.003)			(1.664)	(1.673)
Anti-corruption policy			(0.000)	-0.000			(1.001)	0.785*
				(0.001)				(0.328)
Two-way Interactions				()				(0.020)
Cash holding*Political Tie			0.155***	0.151***			22.419*	25.166*
			(0.016)	(0.017)			(9.979)	(10.051)
Cash holding*Anti-corruption			(0.010)	-0.010***			(). // /)	5.719***
cash holding Anti-conteption				(0.003)				(1.730)
Political tie*Anti-corruption				0.000				0.581
				(0.001)				(0.442)
Three-way Interactions				(0.001)				(0.442)
Cash holding* Political tie*				-0.028***				8.600*
Anti-corruption policy				(0.006)				(3.646)
Year, industry, and province f xed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
constant	0.087	0.055	0.057	0.044	-51.733	122.340	122.750	112.523
CONSIGN	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(105.922)	(85.273)	(85.262)	(85.556)
					0.003			0.007
R2	0.006	0.009	0.015	0.017	()(1)3	0.006	0.006	

n = 18,125; Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Superscripts indicate signif cance at the ^+p < 0.10 $^{\star}p$ < 0.05 $^{\star\star}p$ < 0.01 $^{\star\star\star}p$ < 0.001 level.

(Note: Political ties measurement 1 is a dummy variable coded "1" if a director on the board has current or former political experience and "0" otherwise; Anticorruption policy measurement 2 is the number of government officials investigated in graft cases on corruption fled per 100,000 population in a province in a given year).

many studies focus on the contingent effects of political ties from the perspective of regime change (e.g., Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Siegel, 2007), few examine the underlying motivations and ideologies behind policy changes. We argue that the motivations for the national-level policy changes determine the values of various resources and guide f rms to allocate and integrate them in a new way.

Our results reveal not only how political ties can help encourage innovation spending in a non-transparent institutional environment but also when and why political ties become a less-than-ideal resource for R&D investment after changes such as the anti-corruption campaign. When the political and institutional climate is disrupted, managers must conduct cost/benef t analyses to determine whether the benef t of tapping into political networks outweighs the possibility of being investigated by the government for corruption. Politically connected f rms may then overcompensate by allocating cash elsewhere and choosing to drastically decrease their R&D investment to avoid risky situations. Therefore, our study clarif es the boundary of the effect of f rms' political ties in emerging economies and emphasizes the important role of national-level political shocks in determining the allocation of political and f nancial resources simultaneously. We extend studies that focus on the contingent effect of a single type of resource (e.g., political ties) on a f rm's behavior (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012), and argue that external shocks introduce comprehensive and far-reaching effects on the usage of multiple resources rather than a single resource. Thus, our research framework provides a holistic perspective through which we can examine the contingent effect of environmental factors on multiple valuable resources and explore the changes in their allocation.

Although the positive effect of political ties on innovation in emerging economies is widely acknowledged, they also can lead to the "ineff ciency curse" (e.g., Zhou et al., 2017), in which politically connected f rms are less likely to transform their R&D investment into actual R&D output. Our framework informs the inconsistent f ndings of studies exploring the functional role and unique advantages of political ties in terms of f lling an institutional void, and the pooling of resources associated with innovation in emerging economies (Luo and Chung, 2013; Lux et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2017). However, this approach only

Fixed-effects regression model of cashing holding and f rm's R&D (Political tie = Measurement 2; Anti-corruption policy = Measurement 1).

	DV: R D inv	DV: R D investment					DV:R D outcome				
Variable	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b			
Control Variables											
Firm size	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	1.970*	2.126*	2.143*	2.070*			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.849)	(0.855)	(0.856)	(0.855)			
Firm age	-0.010	0.006	0.008	0.009	-1.823	0.377	0.504	-1.473			
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(9.029)	(9.135)	(9.136)	(9.144)			
Capital	-0.034	-0.023	-0.008	-0.004	-94.484	-92.929	-89.922	-86.189			
	(0.291)	(0.290)	(0.289)	(0.289)	(175.586)	(175.580)	(175.546)	(175.379)			
Advertising	-0.059	-0.062	-0.058	-0.056	6.714	6.278	7.207	6.750			
Ū.	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(24.755)	(24.755)	(24.752)	(24.736)			
Tobin'				. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,				

partially captures the impact of the institutional environment (e.g., Kotabe et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2020). By considering the resource utilization efficiency strategy associated with the anti-corruption policy, our framework provides a more comprehensive understanding of the role of political ties in determining innovation efficiency and helps reconcile previous controversial perspectives (Ramaswamy, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Our results show that the implementation of anti-corruption policies in an emerging market like China's enhances the inf uence of political ties on innovation and reduces the excessive or even wasteful spending on R&D investment caused by the over-reliance on such ties We highlight the functional role of anti-corruption policies in constraining the abuse of political resources, and thus contribute to the literature concerning the effectiveness of f nancial and political resources in terms of innovation.

5.2. Practical implications

This study also has managerial and policy implications First, it provides important practical implications for managers in emerging economies like China's, where technological innovation has become increasingly important. Firms must therefore determine the appropriate level of effort required for developing and maintaining political ties under a variable national political climate: being politically connected can sometimes hinder innovation spending when the connections are under harsher scrutiny.

From a policy perspective, our study suggests that policy makers focused on encouraging companies to conduct innovation must design policies that consider the trends and variation in resource slack levels, be aware of political connections, and consider the innovation portfolios of non-connected f rms, particularly when providing access to innovation funding, f nancial incentives, and subsidies. This can help level the playing f eld and increase the motivations of f rms that would otherwise feel disadvantaged. Our study also suggests that policy makers should focus on improving intellectual property rights protection to provide a stable and safe environment for the innovative activities of nonpolitically connected f rms

The anti-corruption policy is also found to be effective in alleviating the expropriation problem–which can lead to arbitrary and wasteful

investment decisions--and thus enhances the overall effectiveness and eff ciency of innovation. The institutional uncertainties in emerging markets generally hinder innovation and can even lead to capital fight (Shi et al., 2017), so by promoting anti-corruption policies policy makers can help to create a fairer competitive environment for f rms without political ties, enabling them to access government resources for innovation, which encourages f rms at all levels of political networking to pursue innovative activities.

5.3. Limitations and future directions

Our paper has some limitations. Although the Chinese context provides an invaluable opportunity to examine our proposed theoretical framework, our sample is necessarily limited to the Chinese market, which limits the generalizability of our results. Studies that examine other emerging economies such as South Africa, India, Vietnam, and Guyana would be of benef t, particularly when there is turbulence in the institutional environment or national level policy changes. The research framework provided in the current study is well suited to exploring the aftermath of nationwide policy change in rapidly changing economies, and the impact of underlying motivations of such policies on frm innovation effciency and political resources. In addition, when a nationwide campaign takes effect in a large country such as China, numerous within-country differences in policy execution and implementation are likely between different regions. Future studies are encouraged to examine the specific effects of large-scale policy changes on each region with a scale designed to capture the degree of policy implementation and variance in enforcement strength. This will allow within-country differences to be identified and enable meaningful research into large economies that have diverse levels of economic, political, and institutional development among their cities. Studies show that higher levels of local government intervention increase cash holding, while anti-corruption policies decrease them (Xie and Zhang, 2020), so it is important to further examine the fuctuations of cash holding levels and explore how frms spend their cash in ways other than innovation activities. Future studies can thus observe the interaction effects between government intervention levels and cash spending, in terms of strategic behavior across risk levels before and after large-scale

Def nitions and measurements of the variables.

	Variable name	Measurement
Dependent Variables	R D Investment	The ratio of a f rm's R&D expenditures to total assets in year t adjusted by subtracting the median industry-level R&D expenditures to size in the same year (Hillier et al., 2011; Pindado et al., 2010; Chrisman

Table 9 (continued)

SIC Code	Industry Description	Number of Firms	% Firms in Industry
H62	Catering	26	0.143
163	Telecommunications, radio and television and satellite transmission services	79	0.436
164	Internet and related services	280	1.545
165	Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and f shing services	531	2.930
J67	Coal mining and washing	20	0.110
J69	Oil and gas extraction	36	0.199
K70	Ferrous metal mining and dressing	1202	6.632
L71	Non-ferrous metal mining and dressing	21	0.116
L72	Mining auxiliary activities	262	1.446
M73	Agricultural and non-staple food processing	20	0.110
M74	Food manufacturing	77	0.425
M75	Wine, beverage, and ref ned tea manufacturing	10	0.055
N77	Textile industry.	95	0.524
N78	Textile and clothing	122	0.673
P82	Leather, fur, feathers and their products and footwear	44	0.243
Q83	Wood processing and wood, bamboo, rattan, brown, grass products	65	0.359
R85	Furniture manufacturing	117	0.646
R86	Paper and paper products	99	0.546
R87	Printing and recording media reproduction	34	0.188
S90	Manufacturing of cultural and educational, industrial and esthetic, sports and entertainment products	210	1.159

institutional policies are implemented. The specific types of R&D output before and after large-scale policy changes can also be compared. Firms with political ties may be much more eager to produce quick and significant results after facing scrutiny in the changing institutional and political environment, but the long-term performance benefits of different types of R&D outcomes are not necessarily equal. Thus, changes in R&D direction and their impact on performance over time should be examined in more detail.

6. Conclusion

Political ties have been extremely benef cial in China but can have a double-edged effect on innovation eff ciency. Changes in institutional sensitivity to corruption have a major inf uence on the usefulness of political ties when leveraging cash holding for innovation investment and output. We draw on the resource-based view and institutional theory to highlight the resource utilization eff ciency logic of the anti-corruption policy and demonstrate that politically connected f rms are strongly motivated to convert R&D investment into actual outcome. By developing a framework to examine the nuances of investment and outcome, while considering the inconsistencies in the benef ts political ties have for innovation eff ciency under a dynamic institutional land-scape, we provide a new research direction through which the innovation process, political connections, and environmental conditions can be simultaneously explored.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Feifei Lu: Conceptualization, Methodology, Data curation, Investigation, Writing – review & editing. **Zhu Zhu:** Conceptualization, Investigation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Supervision. **Lina Zhu:** Data curation, Writing – review & editing, Data curation, Writing – review & editing. **Hao Gao:** Data curation, Data curation.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing f nancial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to inf uence the work reported in this paper.

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