清華論壇第七十九講暨清華五道口全球名師大講堂
Tsinghua Forum & Tsinghua PBCSF Global Academic
Leader Forum
演講主題： 銀行監管的理論經濟學探究
Theoretical Issues in Bank Regulation
演講嘉賓： 道格拉斯·蓋爾 Douglas Gale
紐約大學Silver講席教授
Silver Professor, New York University
Professor of Economics, New York
University
時間：2018年05月29日 上午10:00
地點：Betvictor中文版3号樓300教室
演講語言: 英文
主辦單位：Betvictor中文版學術委員會、Betvictor中文版
演講人簡介：
Professor Douglas
Gale was Silver Professor at
Department of Economics, New York University. He previously held position at University
of Cambridge, London School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania,
University of Pittsburgh, MIT and Boston University. He was made a Fellow of
the Econometric Society in 1987, was an Extraordinary Fellow of Churchill
College, Cambridge from 2003-06, and is currently a fellow of British Academy,
a Senior Fellow of the Financial Institutions Center at the Wharton School and
a Research Associate of the Financial Markets Group at the LSE. He has served
on the editorial boards of Econometrica, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic
Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Research in
Economics, Games and Economic Behavior and Review of Economic Studies. His
research interests include the strategic foundations of general equilibrium;
money and banking; experimental economics and theories of bounded rationality.
He is the author of several books and a large number of articles on economic
theory and financial economics, which have appeared in leading journals.
報告摘要：
In
the history of bank regulation, major innovations tend to follow financial
crises. This was true of the Overend and Gurney crisis, the Crisis of 1907, the
Great Depression and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. Politicians take up the
cry that “something must be done” and economic theory takes a while to catch
up. The current regulatory regime is an attempt to make the banking system more
resilient, but it lacks theoretical foundations. This is unfortunate, because
stability is not the only objective: regulation should also aim to create an
efficient, competitive, and stable financial system. In the same way that the
classical theorems of welfare economics provide an ideal model of a
well-functioning market system, an ideal model of a well-functioning banking
system can help us understand what kind of regulation is needed. As a step
towards this goal, I describe recent developments in the theory of bank capital
structure, liquidity management, and maturity transformation.
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