主題：Corporate Tax Havens and Transparency（企業避稅港及透明度）

主講人：Stefan Zeume，密歇根大學羅斯商學院金融學助理教授

日期：2016年3月30日（周三）

時間：下午2:30-4:00

地點：清華Betvictor中文版4号樓101教室

語言：英文

摘要：

In hand-collected subsidiary data on 17,331 publicly listed firms from 52 countries, we identify expropriation- related motives for establishing tax haven subsidiaries. First, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) increase average shareholder value of affected firms by 2.5 percent. Second, the effect is stronger for firms with more complex tax haven structures. Third, some firms respond to TIEAs by haven hopping, i.e., they move subsidiaries from affected to non-affected tax havens. Fourth, the shareholder effect is larger for firms with lower institutional ownership. This suggests that (i) tax havens are used for expropriation activities that go beyond pure tax saving activities and (ii) increased transparency is applauded by non-controlling shareholders.

主講人簡介:

Stefan Zeume holds the assistant professor in Finance at Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. He earned his doctoral degree in Finance from INSEAD (France) in 2014. Dr. Zeume’s research interests include corporate finance, corporate governance, corruption, regulation and taxes.